

## Message Text

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PAGE 01 BRASIL 01411 01 OF 02 262056Z  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W  
-----047389 262105Z /64

O R 262010Z FEB 78  
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 6221  
INFO AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO  
AMCONSUL SAO PAULO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 BRASILIA 1411

EXDIS

EO 11652 GDS  
TAGS OVIP (CARTER, JIMMY)  
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL TRIP

REF A. STATE 48077 (NOTAL) B. RIO DE JANEIRO 0879 (NOTAL)

1. CONGEN RIO IS RESPONDING DIRECTLY TO QUESTIONS REFTEL A. CONCERN-  
ING RIO PORTION OF VISIT.

2. RE BRASILIA HOTEL ACCOMMODATIONS (PARA 9, REFTEL A), EMBASSY  
WILL SEEK TO HOUSE ENTIRE OFFICIAL PARTY, INCLUDING PREADVANCE  
AND ADVANCE, IN HOTEL NACIONAL, PLUS AS MUCH OF PRESS AS POSSIBLE.  
WE ARE DISCUSSING SPACE QUESTION WITH HOTEL MANAGER NOW, AND WILL  
ADVISE FURTHER SOONEST.

3. RE PARA 8 OF REFTEL (A), THE EMBASSY CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT  
A MEETING WITH CARDINAL ARNS, ESPECIALLY ONE OUTSIDE OF SAO PAULO,  
IS LIKELY, UNDER THE BEST OF CIRCUMSTANCES (EXCEPT POSSIBLY UNDER  
OPTION A BELOW) TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE GOB AS AN IRRITANT WHICH  
COULD CHILL THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE PRESIDENT'S BILATERALS WITH  
PRESIDENT GEISEL AND, AT WORST, AS A CALCULATED AFFRONT OR PROVOCA-  
TION WHICH COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE ENTIRE VISIT.  
(WE NOTE FROM STATE 45578 THAT IT IS WASHINGTON'S DESIRE GENERALLY  
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TO AVOID GIVING THE VISIT A CONFRONTATIONAL CAST.) WITH REGARD TO THE  
BILATERALS, AN ARNS MEETING COULD, FOR EXAMPLE, CONSIDERABLY SHARPEN  
GEISEL'S REACTION--WHICH COULD IN ANY CASE BE VERY STRON--TO DIS-  
CUSSION OF INTERNAL BRAZILIAN HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES. ON THE OTHER  
HAND, A MEETING WITH ARNS WOULD DEMONSTRATE CNCLUSIVELY TO THE GOB  
AND TO BRAZIL'S CONCERNED PUBLIC THE PRESIDENT'S CONTINUED DEEP  
INTEREST IN HUMAN RIGHTS AND WOULD BE WELCOMED BY THOSE SECTORS

OF BRAZILIAN OPINION WHO APPROVE OF AND TRUST THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY.

4. WE MOST STRONGLY RECOMMEND, WHATEVER THE DECISION WITH RESPECT TO TIMING, LOCATION AND CONTEXT OF A MEETING WITH ARNS(EXCEPT POSSIBLY IN THE CASE OF OPTION A), THAT THE GOB BE OFFICIALLY ADVISED OF THE PRESIDENT'S INTENTIONS PRIOR TO HIS ARRIVAL IN BRASILIA. IN LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT WE WILL BE IN CONSTANT CLOSEST TOUCH WITH GOB OFFICIALS CONCERNING EVERY ASPECT OF PREPARATIONS FOR THE VISIT, FAILURE TO ADVISE THEM OF A PROSPECTIVE MEETING WITH ARNS WOULD SUGGEST AN EFFORT ON OUR PART TO KEEP IT CLANDESTINE AND GREATLY INCREASE THE RISK OF IT IMPACTING ADVERSELY ON THE ENTIRE VISIT.

5. IF THERE IS TO BE A MEETING WITH ARNS., WE BELIEVE THAT SERIOUS CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE DESIRABILITY OF INCLUDING IT IN THE UNOFFICIAL (RIO) PORTION OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT RATHER THAN IN THE OFFICIAL (BRASILIA) LEG. WHILE IN BRASILIA THE PRESIDENT WILL, OF COURSE, BE ON A STATE VISIT AND HIS HOST WILL BE PRESIDENT GEISEL, WITH ELEMENTS OF WHOSE HUMAN RIGHTS PHILOSOPHY CARDINAL ARNS IS IN SHARP DISAGREEMENT. IN RIO, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE PRESIDENT WILL, AFTER HAVING COMPLETED HIS OFFICIAL BUSINESS, BE IN WHAT MR. BRZEZINSKI--ACCORDING TO THE LOCAL PRESS--HAS OFFICIALLY DESCRIBED AS A PLACE FOR ERLAXATION AND CONTEMPLATION. IN OTHER WORDS, THE VISIT TO RIO HAS FROM THE OUTSET BEEN GIVEN AN UNOFFICIAL CAST. (WE WOULD NOTE THAT PORTUGUESE PRIME MINISTER MARIO SOARES SEPARATED THE OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL ASPECTS OF HIS VISIT TO BRAZIL

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IN DECEMBER 1976 IN THIS MANNER).

6. WITH THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS IN MIND, WE SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS WHICH WE RANK IN DESCENDING ORDER OF ACCEPTABILITY:

A. A NINETY-MINUTE MEETING IN THE PRESIDENT'S HOTEL SUITE IN RIO TO WHICH ARNS, RIO'S CARDINAL SALLES, THE GOVERNOR AND MAYOR OF RIO DE JANEIRO STATE AND CITY, RESPECTIVELY, AND SOME 18-20 INTELL-ECTUAL, CULTURAL AND BUSINESS LEADERS FROM RIO AND SAO PAULO WOULD BE INVITED. THIS OPTION WOULD CONSIDERABLY DILUTE THE POTENTIAL AD-VERSE IMPACT ON THE GOB OF A MEETING WITH ARNS; IT WOULD NOT VIOLATE ECCLESIASTICAL PROTOCOL (SEE BRASILIA 1277) AS SALLES WOULD BE INVITED AND, PRESUMABLY, WOULD ACQUIESCE EASILY IN A PRESIDENTIAL INVITATION TO ARNS. ADDITIONALLY, ARNS MIGHT NATURALLY FEEL MORE AT EASE TO TALK FRANKLY WITH THE PRESIDENT IN A LENGTHY ASIDE AT SUCH A GATHERING THAN IN THE THREESIDED MEETING ON SALLES' PREMISES SUGGESTED INOPTION B BELOW. THIS OPTION WOULD ALSO HAVE THE VIRTUE OF ADDRESSING THE CONCERN EXPRESSED IN PARA 4 OF RIO'S 0878 IN RESPONSE TO REFTEL A. (WITH WHICH CONCERN WE AGREE) OF THE EFFECT ON BRAZILIAN PUBLIC OPINION IF THE PRESIDENT DECLINES TO HAVE ANY CONTACT WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND OTHER BRAZILIANS IN BRAZIL'S SECOND LARGEST CITY AND FORMER CAPITAL WHICH THE DEPARTMENT ITSELF HAS DESCRIBED AS "A POPULOUS, DYNAMIC AND HISTORIC AREA

OF BRAZIL", (PARA 5 OF STATE 48077).

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O R 262010Z FEB 78  
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA  
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INFO AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO  
AMCONSUL SAO PAULO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 BRASILIA 1411

EXDIS

B. A MEETING IN RIO TOGETHER WITH CARDINAL SALLES. THIS OPTION WOULD, OF COURSE, FIRST HAVE TO BE TESTED WITH CARDINAL SALLES--WHO, IF AGREEABLE, WOULD HAVE TO INVITE ARNS TO MEET WITH HIMSELF AND THE PRESIDENT. IF ACCEPTED BY SALLES (AND THIS IS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN) IT WOULD HAVE THE VIRTUE OF OBSERVING ECCLESIASTICAL PROTOCAOL AND PROPRIETY (BRASILIA 1277); IT WOULD BE UNDERSTOOD AND ACCEPTED BY CHURCH AND OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS SUPPORTERS IN BOTH OF BRAZIL'S PRINCIPAL CITIES AS WELL AS, BY EXTENSION, ELSEWHERE IN BRAZIL; IT WOULD DILUTE THE ADVERSE IMPACT ON BOTH SALLES AND THE GOB OF AN EXCLUSIVE MEETING IN RIO WITH THE MORE OUTSPOKENLY LIBERAL ARNS; AND, ADDITIONALLY, IT COULD BE JUSTIFIED BY THE EXPLANATION THAT THE OPPORTUNITY OF A COURTESY CALL ON SALLES HAD BEEN EXPANDED, WITH SALLES' ACQUIESCENCE, TO INCLUDE THE CARDINAL OF BRAZIL'S LARGEST CITY WHO HAPPENS ALSO TO BE AN OLD FRIEND OF THE PRESIDENT. THIS OPTION WOULD POST A LOGISTICAL PROBLEM--A CALL ON SALES WOULD ENTAIL E 20-MINUTE DRIVE EACH WAY FROM THE HOTEL.

C. A MEETING IN BRASILIA AT THE PRESIDENT'S HOTEL SUITE. IF THIS OPTION WERE CHOSEN, THE ONLY TIMES AVAILABLE FOR THE MEETING WOULD BE IMMEDIATELY AFTER EITHER THE FIRST OR SECOND OF THE PRESIDENT'S BILATERALS WITH GEISEL. IN EITHER CASE, THE MEETING WITH ARNS WOULD ATTRACT ENORMOUS LOCAL PRESS ATTENTION, WHICH WOULD BOTH INCREASE  
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ITS IMMEDIATE IMPACT AND GREATLY ENHANCE THE LIKELIHOOD THAT GOB KNOWLEDGE OF THE MEETING AND THE ATTENTION IT ATTRACTED WOULD CAST A PALL OVER BOTH THE PRECEDING AND FOLLOWING EVENTS. OBVIOUSLY IT COULD ALSO AFFECT THE TONE OF THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE TO BE ISSUED. AN ADDITIONAL COMPLICATION ATTENDANT UPON THIS AND THE FOLLOWING OPTION IS THAT, IF A MEETING WITH ARNS WERE TO FOLLOW EITHER MEETING WITH GEISEL, MANY OBSERVERS WITHIN AND OUTSIDE OF THE GOB, INCLUDING THE PRESS, WOULD INESCAPABLY DRAW THE CONCLUSION THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS CHECKING WITH ARNS INFORMATION GEISEL MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE IMPARTED TO HIM ON HUMAN RIGHTS. SUCH A CONCLUSION, IF IT WERE SHARED BY PERSONS CLOSE TO GEISEL--TO SAY NOTHING OF THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF--WOULD FURTHER POISON THE ATMOSPHERE.

D. A MEETING WITH ARNS AT THE BRASILIA HEADQUARTERS OF THE NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF BRAZILIAN BISHOPS (CNBB). TO OUR MIND, THIS WOULD HAVE ALL OF THE DISADVANTAGES SET OUT ABOVE, IN ADDITION TO WHICH: (1) A MEETING AT THE CNBB, WHICH WOULD OF COURSE INCLUDE ITS PRESIDENT, CARDINAL LORSCHIEDER, ALSO A STRONG HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCATE, COULD WELL APPEAR TO THE GOB TO CONSTITUTE A STRATEGY SESSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS WHICH THE GOB WOULD IN ALL LIKELIHOOD FIND HIGHLY OFFENSIVE; AND (2) IT WOULD POINT UP EVEN MORE STRONGLY THE FACT THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD NOT VISITED THE SUPREME FEDERAL TRIBUNAL, A VISIT TO WHICH WOULD HAVE HUMAN RIGHTS CONNOTATIONS IN THEIR BROADER SENSE.

7. WHILE WE CANNOT BE REMISS IN OUR RESPONSIBILITY TO POINT OUT THE RISKS, AND OUR BEST THINKING AS TO THE DEGREE THEREOF, INHERENT IN A MEETING OF ANY KIND BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND CARDINAL ARNS, WE ARE AWARE OF THE SOUND ARGUMENTS FOR SUCH A MEETING AND IN ANY CASE ARE PREPARED TO CARRY OUT THE DEPARTMENT'S INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS ISSUE. HOWEVER, WE STRONGLY RECOMMEND, AS THE THRUST OF THIS MESSAGE CLEARLY INDICATES, THAT IF THERE IS TO BE A MEETING WITH ARNS THOSE PLANNING THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT GIVE MOST

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SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THE ADVISABILITY OF BREAKING INTO THE PRESIDENT'S FREE TIME IN RIO FOR THE MEETING. WE BELIEVE THAT SELECTION OF EITHER OF THE RIO OPTIONS SET OUT ABOVE WOULD BOTH ACCOMPLISH THE PRESIDENT'S PURPOSE AND DIMINISH, ALTHOUGH NOT BY ANY MEANS LAY TO REST, THE RISKS TO THE OFFICIAL PORTION OF HIS VISIT TO BRAZIL.

8. A FINAL POINT UNRELATED TO THE ARNS ISSUE. WE AGREE THAT THERE SHOULD NOT BE A WREATH-LAYING CEREMONY IN RIO (PARA 7B OF STATE 48077). IN ADDITION TO THE COMMENT ON THIS ISSUE IN PARA 3 OF RIO'S 0878 IN RESPONSE TO REFTEL A. WE WOULD NOTE THAT SUCH A SYMBOLIC ACT, TAKING PLACE AS CLOSE AS IT WOULD TO THE 14TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE 1964 REVOLUTION, COULD WELL BE SUBJECT TO

WIDESPREAD MISINTERPRETATION.

9. AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO HAS CONCURRED IN THIS MESSAGE.  
JOHNSON

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